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Transnational Legal Pluralism
Peer Zumbansen

*

Abstract
This paper draws out the analogies and connections between long-standing legal sociological
insights into pluralistic legal orders and present concerns regarding the fragmentation of law outside of
the nation state. Within the nation state, the discovery of legal pluralism inspired a larger
contestation of concepts of legal formalism, of the alleged unity of the legal order and of the
hierarchy of norms against the background of a constantly advancing process of
constitutionalisation. This research heightened regulators’ sensitivity to blind spots and exclusionary
dynamics in the design of rights, leading inter alia to wide-ranging efforts to render more effective
access to justice, legal aid and legal representation. Another important consequence concerned an
increased awareness of different levels and sites of norm creation in various societal areas. Much of
this is mirrored by today’s quest for a just, democratic and equitable global legal order, for
example in debates about ‘fragmentation of international law’ or ‘global administrative law’. But,
while the legal pluralism debate largely unfolded in the context (and contestation) of relatively mature
legal orders and institutions, such institutional frameworks and safeguards are largely absent on
the international plane. As a result, the emergence of numerous norm-setting agencies,
specialised courts and tribunals and regulatory networks are perceived as obstacles or
impediments to the creation of a sound legal order on a global scale, rather than as inherent traits of
an evolving legal order.
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In order to grasp the increasingly transterritorial nature of regulatory governance
it is necessary to revisit the arguments in support of legal pluralism and, in particular,
the legal pluralist critique of the association of law with the state. On that basis, it
becomes possible to read the currently dominant narrative of the ‘end of law’ in an
era of globalisation in a different light. Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as
an end-point of legal development, the transnational perspective seeks to deconstruct the
various law-state associations by understanding the evolution of law in relation and
response to the development of ‘world society’. The currently lamented lack of democratic
accountability, say, in international economic governance, can then be perceived as a
further consequence in a highly differentiated and de-territorialised society. The paper
thus rejects attempts by lawyers to realign transnational governance actors with traditional
concepts of the state or of civil society, and instead contrasts them with various advances in
sociology and anthropology with regard to the evolution of ‘social norms’ and ‘spaces’ of
governance and regulation. These perspectives effectively challenge present attempts to
conceptualise a hierarchically structured global legal order. This article’s proposed concept of
‘transnational legal pluralism’ goes beyond Philip Jessup’s 1956 idea of ‘transnational
law’, through which he sought to both complement and challenge Public and Private
International Law. Transnational legal pluralism brings together insights from legal
sociology and legal theory with research on global justice, ethics and regulatory
governance to illustrate the transnational nature of law and regulation, always pushing
against the various claims to legal unity and hierarchy made over time.

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the distinctive features of today’s legal theoretical work on global governance is the
recurring frustration with and problematisation of the absence of stable institutions of
norm creation and enforcement outside of the nation state. While the discrepancy
between the weight and urgency of border-crossing regulatory challenges—such as climate
change, migration and security on the one hand and the existing institutional and
normative framework on the other—arguably lies at the bottom of this malcontent, global
governance must address other concerns as well. One such concern has to do with the
ambiguity of the concept and the term depicting it. ‘Global’ ‘governance’ alludes to two
transformations, namely a shift from government to governance and a counting of time
‘before’ and ‘after’ globalisation. Approaching global governance from this starting point,
however, carries particular risks of juxtaposing inadequately depicted states and
constellations of legal and political order.
Related narratives are often informed by accounts of globalisation as marking a
moment of loss of something that was there before. As will be discussed in more detail
later, this demarcation of before and after inappropriately idealises and petrifies the before
but also limits the range of institutional and normative imagination applicable to the
after. This has significant consequences, for example, when we are confronted with the
alleged loss of legal ‘unity’, ‘certainty’ or ‘hierarchy’ in the global arena as opposed to the
nation state, which in turn is celebrated as an ideal space that now has become lost (or at
least, radically undermined or diminished) and, thus, ill-suited to the demands of a
globalised world. The distinction between the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ of globalisation also
has a tremendous impact on the normative evaluation of what was and what is to come,
something that has become extremely important for the critique of colonialism and
so-called post-colonialism1 and which, in turn, has been a crucial source of critical

scholarship in international law.2
From a different angle, global governance raises serious concerns among critical legal
scholars,

who understandably fear the fast emergence and consolidation of an

allencompassing regulatory framework that is driven more by alleged needs to ‘react’, to
‘monitor’, to ‘facilitate’ and to ‘moderate’ global activity than by a continued engagement
with a political theory of law in a pluralistic and divided world. Where ‘good governance’
then turns into a label and a meta-theoretical justification for ongoing processes of
economic globalisation, alternative proposals, geared towards renewed critiques of property3
and human rights4 and towards the development of empowering, pluralistic transnational
communities5 and forums,6 face serious obstacles.
In light of these complexities of overlapping and conflicting accounts, the disciplinary
field of global governance offers an important opportunity to gain new and further
insights into the building blocks of an emerging legal, political and economic order. The
struggle with the absence of ‘world government’ is undeniably a struggle—over the form
and legitimacy of—any—government itself. As such, current inquiries into the role of the
state and the nature of legal regulation are charged with the translation of an
extremely rich repository of rights critique, ‘law and society’ scholarship, ‘law and
economics’ analysis, and legal anthropology into the discourses unfolding under the
umbrella of an interdisciplinary study of transnational regulatory regimes. Such a research
agenda develops against the background of the ‘anti-positivist’ origins of legal pluralism,7
which eventually evolved into a highly differentiated and empirically driven analysis of coexisting and overlapping regulatory regimes.8 The emergence of ‘governance studies’9 and
the increasingly influential study of law through a regulatory lens10 testify to an
important widening and deepening of the legal analytical apparatus. Seen in this light, the

present obsession with the alleged novelty of a ‘global’ legal and political order has direct
ties to preceding contestations of welfare state governments and their aftermaths in the last
two decades, including a significant functionalisation of regulatory policies and legal
principles.11 Accordingly, much needed inquiries into previous experiences with rights
regimes are fuelled by grave concerns over democratic representation12 but remain torn
between references to state-to-state relations and a concern with global ‘citizens’,13 as well as
over the politics of (domestic) hard and (global) soft laws14 and the nature of rights15 on a
global scale.16 Finally, the competing assertions of market regulation, before and since the
unfolding of the global financial and economic crisis that began in 2007,17 call for a
renewed assessment of the legal nature of markets, long ago scrutinised by Legal Realist
scholars,18 as well as of the particular forms of legal and non-legal regulation that remain at
the centre of ‘law and society’19 scholarship and studies of ‘legal pluralism’.20 What has
become increasingly recognised is the fact that such inquiry cannot remain confined to a
discipline or field on its own: branches of economics as well as a wide range of ‘social
sciences’ have been called upon to contribute to the emergence of a more layered and more
differentiated concept of ‘regulatory governance’.21
In light of these preliminary observations, the paper aims to draw out the analogies and
connections between long-standing legal sociological insights into pluralistic legal orders
and present concerns with the ‘fragmentation’ of law outside of the nation state to show
that the focus on law ‘before’ and ‘after’ globalisation misses the point. In the context of
the nation state and well before the before/after-globalisation optic took hold,

legal

pluralism had contributed to a fundamental contestation of legal formalism and of the
alleged unity and hierarchical structure of the nation state legal order. This research
heightened regulators’ sensitivity to blind spots and exclusionary dynamics in the design of

rights, leading inter alia to wide-ranging efforts to render more effective access to
justice, legal aid and legal representation.22 Another important consequence of legal
pluralist research concerned an increased awareness of different levels and sites of norm
creation,23 work that remains among the central catalysts for a fast-growing body of
regulatory theory literature in law in present times. The ideological battles waged over the
basis and limits of rights, over redistribution and over democratic participation naturally
cross the boundaries of nation states—in both directions.24 Much of this is mirrored by
today’s quest for a just, democratic and equitable global legal order as reflected, for
example, in the debate about the ‘fragmentation of international law’25 or the
aspirations—and limitations—of a ‘global administrative law’.26 But, while the legal
pluralism debate had a strong impact in the context and through the contestation of
relatively mature legal orders and institutions,27 such institutional frameworks and
safeguards are largely absent on the international plane. Accordingly, the emergence of
numerous norm-setting agencies, specialised courts and tribunals and regulatory networks
can be perceived either as obstacles or impediments to the creation of a sound legal order
on a global scale or as inherent traits of an evolving legal order.28
In order to grasp the increasingly transterritorial nature of regulatory governance, it is
necessary to revisit the arguments in support of legal pluralism and, in particular, the
legal pluralist critique of law’s association with the state. On that basis, it becomes possible
to read the currently dominant narrative of the ‘end of law’ in an era of globalisation in a
different light. Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as an end-point of
legal development, a transnational perspective seeks to deconstruct the various law-state
associations by understanding the evolution of law in relation and response to the
development of ‘world society’, a society understood as non-territorially confined,

functionally differentiated and constituted by the co-evolution of conflicting societal
rationalities. The decisive feature of world society is the impossibility of devising one
convincing meta-theory of political governance. 29 Instead, its contours only become
apparent through an incessant confrontation of particular, functionally differentiated
rationalities with a concept of society that remains embedded in a dualist conception of
public and private, state and market. On that basis, the lack of democratic accountability,
say, in international economic governance, 30 can then be perceived as lying squarely
between the further accentuated evolution of a highly differentiated and de-territorialised
society on the one hand and a continued quest for (global) justice on the other. This
suggests a certain scepticism towards attempts to realign transnational governance actors
with traditional concepts of the state or of civil society. In contrast, a more promising
avenue of inquiry seems to involve a study of the evolving actors and norms on the basis of
advances made in sociology and anthropology with regard to the evolution of ‘social
norms’ and ‘spaces’ of governance and regulation,31 but also the concept of ‘economic
governance’ developed in the context of the ‘New Institutional Economics’.32
Against this background, this paper seeks to combine a legal sociological perspective
with a legal theoretical one for a critical reconstruction of ‘legal pluralism’ against the
background of the concept of transnational law, with the aim of developing a concept of
‘transnational legal pluralism’. It attempts to build bridges between, on the one hand, the
long-standing introspection into ‘law and its other’ that has taken place with reference to
political institutions and processes, to the state and a legitimating societal body, and, on
the other hand, the still less known and less travelled global space. The concept of
transnational legal pluralism to be developed in this article goes beyond Philip Jessup’s
1956 idea of ‘transnational law’, through which he sought both to complement and to

challenge Public and Private International Law,33 by bringing together insights from legal
sociology and legal theory with research on global justice, ethics and regulatory
governance to illustrate (what he coined as) the transnational nature of law and regulation,
always pushing against the various claims to legal unity and hierarchy made over time.
While for Jessup the reference to ‘transnational’ served above all to highlight the inability
of the existing disciplines of both public and private international law to capture the
various border-crossing regulatory interactions between public and private or between
private parties, the here-proposed concept of transnational legal pluralism is first and
foremost a proposal to conceive of transnational law from a methodological perspective.
It is thus no longer concerned with a quest for a legal field, which could embrace and
regulate the just described border-crossing nature of hybrid regulatory interaction.
Instead, the term transnational is meant here to identify a methodological space in
which to make sense of the conditions that shape references to law or non-law in
functionally highly differentiated contexts.
These contexts—such as financial markets,34 online sales contracts35 and labour
regulations in and around multinational enterprises36—are characterised by a complex
amalgamation of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, direct and indirect norms that no longer fit under the
semantic umbrella of existing disciplinary fields such as labour law or corporate law. As a
result, not only have the scope and content of such fields come under pressure; more
importantly, the intersection of different forms of ‘regulatory governance’ with regard to
such contexts must now be assessed through a methodological lens. From this perspective,
then, the first insight is into the distinctly interdisciplinary nature of the regulation that
marks a particular context. We see here an intricate co-existence, with overlap and often
competition between legal and, say, economic rules.37

The further insight, of crucial importance from a legal theory point of view, is into the
status of law in this mixed regulatory landscape, and it is here that a concept of
transnational legal pluralism must reach beyond Jessup’s identification of a particular
exhaustion of existing disciplinary fields to depict border-crossing, hybrid interaction.
The central point of the transnational perspective embraced here is that, despite an
emerging consensus regarding the co-existence of legal and ‘other’ forms of regulation, an
observation informed above all by the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’
institutions in the context of New Institutional Economics,38 we are still at a loss as to
how to distinguish between a legal and a non-legal form of regulation. As long as the
distinction is based on the reference to a particular authority, which alone is entrusted
with the production of legal rules—commonly understood to be the state—the
distinction will result in an identification of ‘formal’ institutions with ‘law’ and the state,
while almost every other norm apt to govern or guide human behaviour can only be
considered as ‘informal’. What is left outside of this demarcation is the question of ‘What is
at stake?’ in the choice between a legal and an alternative form of regulation.
For lawyers, this remains extremely unsatisfactory, because the distinction can only be
sustained in blunt negation of the far-reaching legal pluralist insights into the many forms
of legal normative orders. As a result, because lawyers are bound to remain troubled by the
economists’ demarcation of formal versus informal, an important step towards a more
adequate assessment of the regulatory pluralism characterising the abovementioned contexts
is to place a central emphasis on how the distinction between law and non-law is in fact
made. It is here that lawyers are likely to unfold a different set of distinctions from that which
has been informing the economist’s study of institutions. While the economist is herself
pushing ever deeper into the ‘institutional diversity’ that marks complex regulatory

and self-regulatory contexts,39 the gained insights remain confined to an (admittedly
better) understanding of the various rules, norms and behaviour-governing institutions
present in such contexts. Meanwhile, the process through which the distinction
between the legal and a non-legal character of any such institution is made remains
opaque, as long as the distinction is loosely attached to references to state-based or nonstate-based norm-making authorities. Against the background of legal pluralist insights
into the different forms of legal regulation, based on which formal legal systems were being
put to the test in terms of their legitimacy, their openness to change and their responsivity to
social pressure,40 such a narrow interpretation of law cannot stand.
Central to the project of transnational legal pluralism are, thus, the following two
methodological premises. The first concerns the inquiry into the elements that inform the
distinction between law and non-law in any given regulatory context. Precisely because
‘alternatives’ to legal regulation have become impressively self-assured in asserting their
interpretive and governing grip on complex constellations,41 it is even more important to
ask whether there is in fact any role left for law and, in particular, for law’s operation to
introduce the distinction between legal and illegal with regard to a social context.42 The
role of law, as will be developed in more detail below, remains in facilitating and
structuring the space in which trade-offs between legal and non-legal regulations occur.
This structuring of law is bound to function with references to the learned contexts and
institutional frameworks associated with law in a given place at a given time, which
explains a certain preoccupation among continental European lawyers with the allegedly
central role of the ‘state’ in the creation and enforcement of legal rules. At the same time,
the comparative assessment of the binding or mandatory character of law, even in areas of
intense market regulation and self-regulation such as corporate law, already reveals

striking differences in the perception of what is and is not necessary in order to achieve an
adequate level of ordered conduct.43
The second methodological premise concerns the transnational dimension in the
legal pluralist analysis, which is proposed here. ‘Transnational’ demarcates not a
territorially defined and demarcated space, across the boundaries of which regulations are
seen to be either successful or unsuccessful in governing or prescribing behaviour. Rather, the
term depicts the space in which the legal pluralist analysis of legal and non-legal
regulation occurs. It makes reference to the space that is left empty between
conceptualisations of a legal order from either a ‘national’ or ‘international’ perspective.
The term ‘transnational’ is closely connected to the sociological model of the ‘world
society’, a term that radicalises the idea of functional differentiation and traces
communications (in law, economics, religion, politics) primarily with reference to the
particular rationalities of such systems. ‘Primarily’, because any system-theoretical
assessment is likely to continue, for some time to come, to incorporate references to the
‘context’ in which systematic communications occur. From the vantage point of much of
Western legal theory, this context is predominantly the state and, more particularly, the
nation state. However, from the perspective of transnational legal pluralism, while this
context may still be referenced merely to better trace the evolution of a particular system
over time, it does not in itself explain or capture a particular system. In other words, the
‘transnational’ element in transnational legal pluralism seeks to capture this transition
process in legal theory from a state-based depiction and interpretation of legal norms to a
conceptualisation of legal norm creation that unfolds according to principles of functional
differentiation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section (2) revisits the legal

pluralist insights into what is a paradoxical relation between law and non-law. Against this
background, the paper traces the emergence of border-crossing regulatory regimes as a
challenge to state-oriented legal reasoning (section 3) before illustrating the parallels between
the impasses of legal theorising about ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ governance with those that
marked the evolution of the study of law in the nation state. Section 4 revisits the frequently
asked question whether globalisation marks the end of law: attempting a negative answer
(‘law is dead—long live law!’), this section proposes to read the emergence of
‘transnational law’ not as the advent of a ‘new’ field—similar to the way that, say,
environmental law and internet law were once considered novel fields only relatively
recently. Instead, as pointed out above, the central assumption is that transnational law
constitutes a methodological perspective, or paradigm shift in legal theory—an attempt
to bridge the experience of legal pluralism in the nation state with that of the functionally
differentiated world society, that Jessup still sought to capture with reference to an
emerging transnational space. Section 5 pursues this argument and applies it to the initial
paradox between law and non-law. Transnational law can now be understood as a lens
through which to perceive the argumentative parallels between the impasses, roadblocks and
‘impossibilities’ of law that recur both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the nation state. As the
borders of the state are reconstructed as historically contingent reference points for the
evolution of legal reasoning, transnational law becomes the legal theoretical reconstruction of
law/non-law in the world society. The concluding section (6) sets out the framework of
transnational legal pluralism.

2. LAW AND ITS OTHER

Today, many regulatory areas can only be understood as instantiations of global norm
creation. Supply chains that tie regional and global markets together,44 commercial
arbitration,45 food safety

and food quality standardisation regimes,46 internet

governance,47 but also environmental protection,48 crime49 and terrorism50 are key
examples of fast expanding spaces of individual, organisational and regulatory activity
that evolve with little regard for jurisdictional boundaries but, instead, appear to develop
according to functional imperatives. Similarly, fields such as corporate, insolvency and
even labour law that had long been understood as embedded in historically evolved
political and regulatory economies,51

today display a distinctly de-nationalised

character,52 which we should approach from the distinct methodological perspective
indicated above. Constituted through a complex overlapping of different national,
international, public and private norm-creation processes, these fields underscore the
conundrical nature of a proliferating and expanding global regulatory space: in response,
state-based responses that draw on architectures of normative hierarchy, separation of
powers and unity of law53 are likely to fall short of grasping the nature of the evolving
transnational normative order.54
In their search for appropriate labels, concepts and instruments for this regulatory
space, lawyers have long been forming alliances with scholars in a wide range of social
sciences including sociology, political science, economics and geography.55 Such
interdisciplinary collaboration in practice and methodology is anything but new to law
and legal theory: building as it does on early beginnings established by social scientists that
emphasised the importance of social facts and increasingly incorporated empirical
findings,56 the study of law has for the longest time been carried out in close proximity
and in the constant shadow of social studies.57 The legal sociological projects at the end of

the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century58 can today be seen as
eminent precursors to a presently further intensifying study of the institutional foundations of
legal systems in a constellation marked by the erosion of boundaries between domestic
legal orders and the continuing contestation of the normativeconceptual foundations of the
rule of law as well as the welfare state and its ambiguous aftermath.59 The Legal Realist
attack on formalism,60 the post-War natural law/legal positivism debate,61 the emergence
of a particular strand of legal pluralism in the wake of post-colonialism,62 the rise of
‘law and society’—both from the left63 and from the right64—as well as the critique of
juridifications65 have since given way to a cacophonic contestation of the merits and limits of
‘law’s knowledge’, its evolving nature and role.66 Seen in this light, the search for the
‘nature of law’ has always been carried out on the pretentious assumption that it is or must
be different, that law is—or, in the end can be— different from religion, morality and
economics.67 But the short twentieth century has left this idea of law battered and torn,
scarred and violated.68 Any attempt, then, to resurrect this assumption must be perceived as
either naive or incredulously courageous. As depicted in Table 1 opposite, the following
definitions of or approaches to law come to mind: law as a means of oppression, of
corruption and domination, or law as a promise of hope, as an instrument of liberation
and emancipation. Its schizophrenic character is owed to its paradoxical foundation,69 the
impossibility of its legitimate creation out of a void,70 out of one or more acts of
violence.71 Historically, as law differentiates and emancipates itself from politics,
economics, religion, not in order to ‘rise above’ but, rather, to immerse and embrace
and to juridify society in its inexhaustible complexity,72 it threatens either to suffer the fate
of Icarus or to evaporate into thin air. Its immodest, impossible claim must be to be outside
of society (politics, economics, religion), but at the same time to be (the law of) society.73

Rather than attempting to define law in a purely conceptual space, we ought to approach it
by looking at the way that it distinguishes itself from alternative programs of order. This
should, then, be the starting point for understanding the nature of law, rather than an earthshattering revelation after a seminar in deconstruction. Law’s other is, thus, deeply inherent in
any program of law and in law’s lurking denial, ridiculisation and (self-) destruction.
The difficulty in understanding law has to be seen against the background of a
blurring of boundaries between ‘law’ and ‘society’.74 As pointed out by Roger Cotterrell,

Table 1: Definitions of Law

1

Law as an institutionalised system of rule enforcement

2

Law as a means of stabilising expectations

3

Law as a means of oppression

4

Law as hope

5

Law as a parasite—without method, heart or soul …?

‘[l]aw constitutes society in so far as it is, itself, an aspect of society, a framework and an
expression of understandings that enable society to exist. A sociological perspective on
legal ideas is necessary to recognise and analyse the intellectual and moral power of law in
this respect.’75 Understanding law, then, as a ‘social phenomenon’,76 Cotterrell observes that
the distinction between law and society does indeed blur: the internal/external
distinction is ‘replaced by a conception of partial, relatively narrow or specialised
participant perspectives on (and in) law, confronting and being confronted by,
penetrating, illuminating, and being penetrated and illuminated by, broader, more

inclusive perspectives on (and in) law as a social phenomenon’.77 He rightly posits that
the ‘[s]ociological interpretation of legal ideas is not a particular, specialized way of
approaching law, merely co-existing with other kinds of understanding. Sociology of law in
this particular context is a transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden
understanding of law as a social phenomenon.’78 Such a perspective on law must be
understood as an attempt to respond to law’s own lack of methodology: ‘Law does not
have a “methodology of its own” and borrows methodologies from any discipline that can
supply them.’79 He concludes that a sociological reflection on legal ideas would be to
reflect ‘methodologically law’s own fragmentary varied methodological characteristics’.80

3. THE TRANSNATIONALISATION OF LEGAL GOVERNANCE

A. Law’s Utopia
As the shifting of our analytical focus beyond the boundaries of the nation state has been
providing the stage for the study of law in the recent past,81 the framework of
transnational legal pluralism proposed here82 seeks to capture the methodological
challenge arising for law and social theory to make sense of the emerging normative order of
the world society. In situating this concept in dialogue with theoretical approaches
regarding ‘transnational law’,83 ‘transnational commercial law’,84 ‘global law’,85 ‘law and
globalisation’,86 ‘transnational spaces’87 and ‘communities’,88 ‘global legal pluralism’,89
‘hard versus soft law’,90 ‘law and social norms’91 or ‘law as product’,92 the conceptual
boundaries of the present approach are constantly relativised and challenged by these
parallel endeavours.
Importantly, this multi-trajectory evolution of legal theory can be studied as a process of

law’s transnationalisation. Despite its prima facie appearance as being relevant
exclusively within the nation state’s framework of legal ordering, the abovementioned
scholarly projects in legal sociology and legal theory as well as in anthropology and
philosophy of law are reflective of the changing environment of legal systems. This
transformation is first and foremost perceived as one of eroding boundaries, boundaries
between form and substance93 or between public and private94 (‘states’ and ‘markets’95),
but is at its core concerned with the contestation, deconstruction and relativisation of
the boundaries between law and non-law.96 At the height of the regulatory state with its
climactical belief in juridification and in law as social engineering,97 law stares into the
abyss of its own demise and potential irrelevance, and it is from this vantage point that
law must be rethought and reasserted as social science, as one among other conceptual
approaches to the study of the regulation of modern societies.
Only against this background can we comprehend that we are bound to engage in
studies of historical forms of legal/non-legal regulation in an ironic/paradoxical sense of law.
In other words, references to ‘legal’ regulation are used in an aspiringly ‘watertight’ sense
in order to demarcate one form of regulation from an alternative form of, say,
economic regulation. At the same time, the reference to ‘legal’ regulation is of course
based on the premise that its legal character can only be thought of as paradoxical, as a
rejection of something opposite that needs to remain present in order for the other part to
make any sense. The paradoxical co-existence of legal and non-legal, then, captures the
above-described potentials of law (as oppressor or emancipator), something that
history most often records in alternations. Craig Scott has likened the conceptual analysis
(concerning the term ‘transnational law’) to an ‘ironic interactive space between keeping
faith and breaking faith. Often enough, this will involve digging into a mixture of

inchoateness and inconsistencies in the practice or tradition and coming to grips with the
epistemological pluralism of the field.’98
In the concert of different approaches to the regulation of modern society, those fields
that seem to escape a clear association with this or that regulatory approach—such as lex
mercatoria—begin to play a crucial role in the contemporary assessment of law’s role in
society, precisely because they challenge our understandings of the nature of legal
regulation in fundamental ways.99 Well beyond the issue-concerned analysis of the role and
place of lex mercatoria in the still evolving field of transnational commercial law,100 it
became, and to a certain degree remains,101 a case in point of a larger critical and
legalsociological inquiry into the possibilities and forms of legal regulation. Over the last two
decades, then, the discussion of lex mercatoria, of its historical origins, its nature and
scope has always also been an attempt to address the challenge of law by its ‘other’, by that
which might either never become ‘law’ or is (for various reasons) not yet recognised as law,
most likely because lex mercatoria is presented as resulting from private norm creation and
administration and which the legal order observes as an exception or a threat.102 Against the
background of the fast intensifying interdisciplinary theorisations of comparative law and
legal pluralism,103 the lex mercatoria debate must also be understood primarily as a
methodological challenge asking us to reflect on the possibility—but also the politics—of
‘law’, which can be but need not be state-originating, which can be but need not be
privately created or which in fact results from a complex interaction between official and
unofficial norm creation. It is here that the real challenge of lex mercatoria as an example of
the evolution of an ‘autonomous’ transnational legal regime104 becomes most obvious. Lex
mercatoria offers a good insight into the complexity of the concept of transnational law,
precisely because of its multi-layered and hybrid nature, in particular as regards the

interpenetration of public and private modes of norm creation and norm enforcement in
this area.
In the absence of world government, attempts to demarcate a legal system adequate to
the ‘post-national constellation’105 feature, above all, a deep-running anxiety in the face
of a perceived lack of unity, coherence and institutional and normative hierarchy.106 The
procedural and substantive architectures of fast-emerging global regulatory regimes107
raise questions that go to the heart of present legal-theoretical attempts to make sense of
‘global governance’ and that many still continue to address through the lens of the state.108
These questions arise, notably, around the ‘politics of private lawmaking’109 and as such
concern primarily the constitutional dimensions of private ordering, that is, issues of
accountability, legitimacy and democratic control.110 As increasingly specialised, functionally
differentiated problem areas and spheres of human and institutional conduct evolve in
response to a combination of external impulses and their own particular logics,111
the law governing these constellations becomes deeply entwined in these complex,
layered constitutions.112 The heterarchical and network dimensions of this
functionalist evolution of law113 stand in stark contrast to the image of law as extending
its regulatory grasp downward from the tip of a hierarchical pyramid into society:
functionally differentiated law is forced to constantly embrace evolving institutional
permutations114 that prove infinitely more complex and heterarchical than even
institutional economics would have us believe.115 Like a veil, law lays itself on the surfaces
of the shifting institutional body, and through its semi-transparent, highly lacerable
material it makes visible, and sensitises the observer to, the anatomy of the evolving torso,
its muscles, bones, joints, strains, injuries and lesions.116

B. Defining Law
This image of law captures the functionalist attack on the keenly guarded bastion of legal
formalism at the end of the nineteenth century117 as much as the horror vacui that
eventually caught up with the process of destruction as legal scholars immersed
themselves in empirical foundations of law, only to realise that the edifice of law was
beginning to dissolve before their very eyes.118 The search for law in the face of its fall
from unifying triumph into evaporation, helplessness, abuse and abolition119 inspired the
post-World War II autopsy of positivist and natural law theories of law120 that
eventually gave way to a radical opening of legal theory and doctrine to the diversity of
existing social ordering systems.121 From this perspective, the evolution of law as a
regulatory tool in the latter half of the twentieth century provides ample opportunities to
reflect on the way in which law has been asserting itself as a reformist, emancipatory,
empowering tool on the one hand,122 and as a deeply violent, usurping, hegemonising
force on the other. Indeed, its conflictual nature cannot be imagined without that which
threatens to consume and suffocate it. The sobering fate of social-reformist legal theories in
the aftermath of the regulatory welfare state123 and, in particular, their embrace of the
functionalist enactment of the moderating or ‘enabling state’ at the end of the century124
should caution us against investing too much hope in law as a weapon, voice or tool of
resistance. The turn and transformation of responsive125 and reflexive126 law programs in
highly mature constitutional cultures into flexible regulatory programs that accompanied (and
accommodated) a growing distrust in state regulation and political-reformist legal theory in
the name of efficiency127 and ‘good governance’ present a formidable challenge to the postwelfare state depictions of ‘alternatives to law’.128 At the end of the twentieth century, the
grand narratives of social order and progress carry the stain of Eurocentrism and

hegemony,129 and the fate of law becomes fully caught up in this maelstrom.130 Its claim
to authenticity becomes a matter of radical contestation as law’s aspiration to rule, guide,
direct and control is challenged by a fast proliferating host of sites of normative orders.131
Where does the progression of legal definitions in Table 1 leave us? Does the
contradictory nature of the first four definitions leave the fifth as the only viable one?
Obviously, law’s self-destruction began before globalisation. 132 Globalisation, as
alluded to in the introduction to this article, can provide a label to depict what should be
seen as a further stage of reflection on the relationship between law and its other rather than
as an endpoint of the possibility of law. The predominance of law’s institutionalisation
in the Western nation state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries not only casts a
long shadow over our present attempts to imagine law, it is also bound to make us blind
to other, alternative approaches to political legitimacy and legal order.133 While the
challenge of law in, or in relation to, the twentieth century welfare state is its functional
diffusion and normative evaporation, that of the ‘new developmental state’ is a radical
challenge to presuppositions regarding the role of the state or the meaning of public and
private.134 To be sure, this temporalisation (‘after’ globalisation) indicates a paradigm
shift, a conclusion and abdication of a dominant concept, rather than demarcating a
historical development of an institutional framework that would comprehensively replace
the preceding models of the state and modes of legal thinking.135 The importance of this
taxonomy of models of state, models of law and legal method lies in its promise of
providing us with a tableau of law’s evolution at least since the late eighteenth century
into the present. But, as noted, the implied idea of progress, or even of historical
evolution, is treacherous. While such historiography would allow us to trace

the

construction of conceptual frameworks, in our case the association of (changing) law with

the (changing) state, it nevertheless runs the risk of mistakenly exaggerating that very
nexus between law and the state. That is where the third column in Table 2 (overleaf)
becomes central: following a dialectical logic, it should here provide for the negation of
thesis (formal law) and antithesis (substantive law). Yet, what we see is the diffusion of
categorical boundaries that we used to refer to in order to distinguish between different
models of state and different models of law. Western legal theory, for much of the
twentieth century, occupied itself with the impossibility of distinguishing between ‘public’
and ‘private’ as a manifestation of the paradoxical foundation of law’s legitimacy with
reference to the separation of the state and the market, of politics and economics.136 Yet it
is this irresolvable tension between the public and the private137 that winds like a red thread
through the evolution of models of state and law. The ‘present’—which of course is only
perceived as such today from our particular viewpoint, but is meant as the always inherent
potentiality of state and society in the evolution of each ideal type of the state, and which
is depicted in the third column—might in the ‘future’ be revealed as the notyet, as an
immodest pretension of a stage of closure. But, that we don’t know. For now, it signifies a
moment of inability. The third column captures the impossibility of adequately rendering the
present model of state. It gives expression to the inaptitude of applying categories of
formal or substantive law to the proliferating sources and regulatory regimes of rule
generation that apply to myriad social practices.
Table 2: The Law and the State

Model

of

Rule of law

Social state/

Enabling state, moderator state, supervision

Model
state of law

Formal

welfare state
Substantive

state/civil society, risk society, world society
Procedural

Legal

Deduction

Balancing

Experimental

method

What Table 2 tries to capture, then, is the association of a particular model of law (formal,
substantive, procedural) and legal methodology (deduction, balancing, experimentation)
with a particular model of the state. This association is reflective of the tendency to
imagine law in correlation with a historically evolving model of the state, for which we in
the West—through the course of the twentieth century—have been crafting labels such as
‘rule of law’, ‘welfare state’ and, into the present, ‘enabling state’. This association has been
misleading in two ways: first, it suggests the false replacement of a ‘previous’ (eg the rule of
law) by a ‘succeeding’ model (eg the ‘social’ or ‘welfare state’), in other words, the end of
one model and the beginning of the next. Such a depiction is misleading in that it
overstates the development of a maturing human rights awareness and codification/
institutionalisation—often associated with the emergence of the welfare state—by
suggesting that the rule of law does not encompass such an understanding of human
rights. What this table misrepresents, then, is the irresolvable and creative tension between
the models of the rule of law and the welfare state (and the associated models of law and
legal methodologies): this tension is irresolvable because formal and substantive are two
sides of law. The depiction of law as either ‘formal’ or ‘substantive’ in association with the
rule of law or the welfare state is thus not an expression of historical progression; rather it
is about which understanding of law dominated (over the other) in relation to a
particular model of the state. What the labels depict, then, is less an objective reality of a
particular type of state and more the dominant understanding of a certain type of state
and its law. As such, Table 2 seeks to capture the often polemical assertions in terms of
what kind of law is possible or impossible with regard to a particular model of the state.
The other way in which the table’s suggestion regarding models of law and state and
respective methodologies is misleading concerns the invisibilisation of the self-referential

character of all three columns. Instead of depicting a clean, historical succession of
paradigms of state and law, the table is meant to capture the present attempt, expressed in
the third column, to make sense of already existing and competing definitions of the state,
its law and its method. As such, the table recounts historically found, tentative
assertions regarding the nexus between the state and the law only to show how our present
efforts at understanding this nexus are shaped by the complex history of the association
of different models of the state with evolving understandings of law.
Law’s experimentation, captured in the third column of Table 2, might be an adequate
depiction of law as parasite, of a law that has no proper method of its own and follows a
wide-ranging variety of demands. But law’s experimentation might also be the expression of
law in search of itself, of a law that cannot be sure of itself, its identity, its potential and
foundations. Its stubborn self-reassertion, then, happens only from an ironical stance.
Authority gained from the state has become a fleeting reassurance at best, considering
the diversification and decentralisation of rule making and enforcement in modern states.
Authority gained by an appeal to a higher order is inevitably based on the belief in a
functioning, validating and legitimating process of interpretation, application and
implementation. As such, issues of authority become irreversibly tied to issues of
distribution,138 merging the ‘models’ of the rule of law and the social/welfare state into a
paradoxical concept, whose historical appearance is merely contingent. It then becomes
clear that what comes ‘after’ the welfare state might either be the super-welfare state or its
demise, the neo-liberal enabling state: as models, however, they are but labels for a
particular stage of institutional evolution. They say little if anything about the law of the
present.

4. PLACES AND SPACES, WHITHER LAW?

With legal imagination haunted by images of a world of injustice, unequal distribution
and grave rights abuses,139 the question becomes whether there is any room, role or even
need for law in a globalised world. This question lies at the bottom of the current
engagement of lawyers with global governance issues. As identified in the preceding
section, this inquiry cannot be isolated from the struggle for law that has so far been
identified with the state. The central thesis of this paper is that this alleged crisis of law
and legal regulation, whether depicted as a loss of state sovereignty or as a problem of
lacking (democratic, political) accountability140 and legitimacy,141 should instead be
understood as a particular amplification of a fundamental problem with law. In that
respect, it can be shown that many of our present concerns about the fate of law in relation to
a continuing transformation of the state in relation to contemporary forces or processes of
globalisation

or

transnationalisation

and

resulting

contestations

of democracy,

legitimacy and accountability must be assessed against the background of a
reconstruction of legal evolution in the national, local context. Without suggesting that the
legitimacy and regulatory challenges connected with the ‘amorphous’ concept of
global governance142 are simple restatements or mirror reflections of locally experienced
moments of ‘exhaustion’,143 there is a particular role to be played by local, domestic
regulatory experiences for the conceptualisation of global governance regimes. The
discussion focusing on the role of law occupies a particularly challenging place in this
inquiry, because the rise of globalisation is so often associated with the demise of law144 and
with an immense pressure on law and legal institutions. Instead, globalisation can be

understood as an invitation to reflect on the connections between our attempts to make
sense of a fragmented global, normative order and our particular, yet anything but
homogenous, experiences with law and regulation at the national level. In short, then,
the argument is that globalisation does not pose a first or a new advent of a ‘crisis’ of law,
understood as a tool of regulation. Instead, the varied history of law reveals the always
inherent combination of hubris and fragility, violence and vulnerability that underlies the
idea and experience of law. This becomes particularly clear where transnational efforts at
‘improving’ the legal conditions in vulnerable contexts such as labour law encounter the
need to develop a better understanding of both the power dynamics at play between the
norm-exporting and the norm-receiving country and the differences in the regulatory
framework on the ground.145
Moreover, while there is much to learn from studying law against the background of a
particular, national, historical context,146 the transnational constellation further
exacerbates the scope of this inquiry. Much suggests that the particular nature of the
transnational arena defeats our attempts at understanding the relation between the
national and the ‘post-national constellation’147 as a linear one—either on a
chronological or a systematic level.148 But, at the same time, the evolving transnational
nature of regulatory regimes as, for example, in corporate law149 or, again, in labour
law,150 presents itself not as an opposition to or the negation of the possibility of extending the
reach of legal regulation, but as a challenge to reassert the place and role of law in
response to the thesis of law’s demise in an era of globalisation. Reconceiving law as
transnational suggests that domestic experiences with ‘law’ are crucial reference points.
Yet, they cannot serve as reference points of institutional or normative design, which we
could simply ‘rediscover’ and amplify for a transposition into the transnational arena.

Instead, this approach must point towards two investigative strands. The first is that the
inquiry into the evolution and, eventually, crisis of law as regulation of social activity has to
attempt the reconstruction as an ironic project that is concerned with the meaning and
aspiration of law as such: it is here that the positing of law is directly challenged by the
prospect of its impossibility, by its fundamental negation. This constellation can be
grasped as the relation or tension between law and non-law, between legality and
legitimacy, between law and justice, society, or other.151 One strand of the ensuing inquiry is
formed by the reconstruction of local (eg national) experiences with law as constantly
challenged by its opposite or its foundations, embeddedness or contestations.152
The second investigative strand is to return to the original starting point of our
reflections on how globalisation challenges law. In this dimension we are concerned with the
task of adequately incorporating, or perhaps only acknowledging, the gap between the
particular context in which norms and the normative environments have evolved locally on
the one hand, and the emerging, allegedly unruly spaces of normative order at the global
level on the other. As indicated above, a reflection on the field of transnational law, a notion
which Jessup offered in the 1950s to capture the hybrid regulatory space between the
national and the international,153 should lead to its unfolding as a methodological device
rather than to a demarcation of a more or less definable legal field. Approaching
transnational law from a methodological perspective should help us to refrain from too
quickly depicting the ‘transnational’ as a distinct regulatory space, which differs from the
national and the international because of its de-territorialised scope and its hybrid,
including mixed public-private, constitution. Instead, transnational law can be perceived as
a particular perspective on law as part of a society, which itself cannot sufficiently be
captured by reference to national or de-nationalised boundaries.

This depiction most certainly echoes a systems-theoretical understanding of a
functionally differentiated world society where law constitutes one amongst several
particularly coded communications. Scholars intrigued by Luhmann, who in concluding his
seminal treatise on the ‘law of society’ famously questioned the survival of law in a
global context,154 have followed in his footsteps by pointing to the normative evolutions
occurring within emerging transnational regulatory regimes and have thus made a
number of constructive suggestions to think ‘law without the state’.155
Yet, it might be possible to push these advances even further. The attempts at
understanding transnational law as a methodological inquiry into the nature of norms
reconnect this inquiry with a longstanding investigation into the nature of law—and its
contestations. The transnational dimension, then, arises not only with respect to
territorial or jurisdictional confines, but also from the perspective of following the
institutional modes of norm creation deep into highly specialised areas of societal activity. It
is here that the idea of transnational law reveals its ambivalent relationship to the ‘old’ and
the ‘new’: on the one hand, transnational law appears to be embedded in and to be
unfolding against the background of a state-centred understanding of a legal order, while on
the other hand, the concept is connected to the longstanding and ever-increasing
experiences of normative pluralism that sit uncomfortably with systematisations of
law as necessarily connected to the state.156 From the point of view of systems theory,
these differentiated ‘areas’ are constituted in functionalist terms: as the functional
differentiation of society leads to a radical unfolding of society as world society, the
challenge for law consists in existing and operating in a simultaneous recognition and
disrespect vis-à-vis a known, sophisticated institutional and normative framework.157
The current assertions, say, on this and that side of the Atlantic of a so-called ‘global’

administrative or ‘general public law’ speak volumes about this challenge.158
While this uncoupling of social systems from a state-associated framework of political,
economic and legal order certainly presents a dramatic challenge to state-centred theories of
law, its real gist in fact lies elsewhere. The—for lawyers—uneasy relationship between
‘society’ and ‘world society’, between the national and the global, that is the
transnational, should in fact not be seen as a threat but instead as an element inherent in the
constitution of legal spaces. From this perspective, transnational refers to the ‘other’ of
the law, which challenges but simultaneously recognises its locally learned relations to
concrete structures of embeddedness, to particular experiences of historical evolution and
contextual differentiation. Transnational law, then, is a way of questioning and
reconstructing the project of law between places and spaces, where—in other words—
places and spaces do not necessarily have to map onto territorial or geographical sub-strata
or be divisible somehow into national or international. This perspective raises hopes for a
realisation of the project of law, whereby law would necessarily have to be understood as
having a recoverable, revivable emancipatory potential. But, what if that were not the
case and questions of democratic governance would attain an endlessly hollow sound in
a globalised world?159 What if the fragility of law would win the day, if law’s
corruptibility would prevail over its absurdly stubborn insistence on its existence, its very
raison d’être?
Again, the ‘outside’ perspective of globalisation proves surprisingly helpful in further
sharpening our investigative focus: the extremely unsure fate of social and political rights in
transnational spaces underscores the challenge that lawyers face in pursuing law as a
critical project in an increasingly integrated world.160 In the emerging global spaces of
highly specialised functional societal activities, both legal and political power have fared

very differently from economic power. The weakness of the former in relation to the long
undeterred success of the latter is reflected in the persistent absence of an effective global
legal-political order. In this space, the transposition of legal instruments and concepts,
which were developed on the domestic level, onto the level of regulating cross-border
transactions—both public and private161—occurs as a translation exercise. Not only is
the institutional crystallisation of the global space intimately interwoven into local
structures while facilitating a disembedded self-regulatory, highly dynamic space, but the
same tension between place and space repeats itself with regard to the normative
dimension.162

5. THINGS WE LOST?

The preceding observations point to an assessment of things we (allegedly) lost as a
layered account that is informed by a double perspective on legal memory. One story of
loss is directly linked to the difficulties of translating both institutions and concepts from the
national to the transnational level. This well-known story, however, is quite
misleading, in the sense that it renders invisible the inherent fragility of law that has always
been there and that thus existed ‘before’ globalisation.163 The already noted laments
concerning the alleged erosions of sovereignty, of legal hierarchy and unity, of democracy
and legitimacy, that are seen in close connection to the state’s loss of regulatory ability in
particular to govern transnational activities, can now be read as a reversal of what has
been a longstanding critical stance towards law. The depiction of an allegedly external
influence, sub verbo globalisation, which is exerted on nation states to subdue national
governments and political actors from the outside by offsetting previously existing

institutional and normative arrangements obscures the degree to which all such
arrangements had always been contestable and fragile from the beginning.164 Reminding us
of Martti Koskenniemi’s depiction of the reversal of emergency and normal in the
justificatory debates over the Kosovo intervention,165 the image of globalisation as threat to
the sovereignty of the state and the unity of law washes over the highly contested
grounds on which the two have always been resting.166 In order to explore this contention
further, the next section briefly ties the current investigations about the fate of law in the
transnational context back to the critique levelled against the regulatory state during the
1970s and 1980s.

A. Law as Non-Law
Current research into the breathtaking development of transnational regulatory regimes
prompts intriguing parallels to previous inquiries into the driving forces of legal regulation,
in particular the development of ‘legal pluralism’ and ‘law and society’ in the 1970s and
1980s. For one, legal pluralists and law and society scholars crucially contributed to a better
understanding of the ‘semi-autonomous’ nature of legal fields: as pioneered in Sally Falk
Moore’s analysis of law in her 1976 article,167 law is understood as constituted in part by
social norms, routines, customs and practices, and in part by hard legal regulation. The
ensuing notion of law as a semi-autonomous field proved to be vitally important in
opening our eyes to the intricate relations between the regulator and concrete, local,
intimate social spaces.168 Furthermore, striving for alternatives to the at times heavy-handed
social engineering by the legal machinery, scholars called for extralegal activism169 and
delegalisation.170

Such a growing understanding of the tensions between ‘lifeworld and system’,171 ‘the
raw and the cooked’,172 or ‘core and periphery’173 would soon become instrumental in the
critical assessment of the role of legal regulation in a highly pluralistic society during the
middle of the twentieth century, which until then had remained very much within the
intellectual and conceptual confines of Max Weber’s distinction between substantive and
formal rationalities of law.174 In his astute analysis of law’s evolution from substantive to
formal rationality along with the emergence of the bureaucratic rule of law, Weber had
identified on the one hand the stabilising role of law for the conduct of commercial (and
other) affairs, while, on the other, he had emphasised the potentially harmful effects of
ever-recurring anti-formal tendencies on the body and practice of law.175 Weber’s
sensibility to the contestations—the anti-rational, material challenges—to the aspiringly
formal edifice of law176 turned out to foretell the ensuing evolution of legal regulation well
into the highly sophisticated regulatory architectures of Western welfare states,177 plagued by
a purposive and intentional regulatory overdrive.178 It comes as no surprise, then, that the
reflection on the place of law in a canon of voices of social ordering that lawyers and social
theorists in North America were concerned with,179 was somewhat echoed by the critique of
‘instrumental’ and ‘regulatory’ law in an overly zealous welfare state apparatus in Western
Europe.180
On both sides of the Atlantic, the responses to the financially and normatively
exhausted welfare state181 soon split into progressive182 and conservative183 camps. This
context is worth bearing in mind when assessing today’s academic and political proposals in
the wake of the financial crisis. In the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which saw
a far-reaching crumbling of social-democratic policy and a growing scepticism for
Keynesian economics, a fairly ambitious theoretical proposal was made that aimed to

resituate law in a more accentuated model of society: in this model, which did not lend
itself to a straightforward ideological appropriation, society is composed of intersecting, but
separate, communications that are each constituted by a distinct terminology (‘code’). Law
was to be understood as one of these social systems—along with the ‘economy’, and with
‘politics’, ‘religion’ and ‘art’.184 On this basis, the concept of ‘reflexive law’ was
proposed as a form of law marked above all by a crucial exposure to and immersion in its
surrounding systems, while it simultaneously remained ‘operationally’ closed. Due to its
‘cognitive’ openness, however, law must constantly receive impulses (or ‘irritations’) and,
relying on its autopoietic nature, formulate legal responses—ie continue its
systematic operation—in the context of a constantly changing environment. In the face of
the weakening welfare state and the growing frustration with ineffective, undemocratic, overgeneralising and paternalising regulatory laws,185 the concept of reflexive law was offered
to explain the particular challenge and form of legal regulation in a complex world. Its
contested186 core consisted of understanding law as being taken out of a learned institutional
context made up of official institutions authoritatively creating stateoriginated laws,
and instead being forced to reassert itself in highly diversified complex environments. This
radicalisation of law’s functional orientation constituted a new stage in the assessment of
law’s institutional form, as it has been learned over time. Whereas law is still today most
often associated with the state, already the legal sociological work at the turn of the century
as well as the legal pluralist work since the 1960s and 1970s had long questioned the lawstate nexus.

B. The Amnesia of Transnational Regulation

But reflexive law came at a price, as its methodological orientation turned out to be highly
attractive to those who wanted to deconstruct the state in the interest of market
liberalisation. The turn away from the state and to the market at the end of the twentieth
century can be seen as smartly employing the very methodological orientations that had
informed the reconstructive legal projects in the face of a financially and normatively
exhausted welfare state187 in the 1980s. The fragile reconstructions of law through the
concepts of responsive or reflexive law on both sides of the Atlantic eventually fed into a
large-scale rejection of state ‘intervention’ throughout the 1980s and 1990s. When
politically progressive scholars in the 1970s and 1980s had turned to alternative modes of
legal regulation seeking to translate law’s generality into contextual, learning-oriented
forms of socio-legal regulation, they had hoped to save the political ambitions of the
welfare state, while continuing the socio-political debate over the substance and direction of
political intervention.188 In contrast, both today’s neo-formalism and today’s
neofunctionalism threaten to cut the ties between the current quest to answer the challenges
of globalisation and the previous struggles over law and politics. Its proponents
characterise legal regulation as inappropriately policy-driven and as an undue infringement
on societal actors’ capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously.189 Boaventura de
Sousa Santos aptly captured this development in the following observation: ‘In a model
based on privatization, private initiative and market supremacy, the principles of order,
reliability, and trust cannot be commanded by the state. They can only come from the law
and the judicial system, as a set of independent and universal systems which create standard
expectations and resolve litigation through legal frameworks which are presumed to be
understood by everyone.’190
With the renaissance of neo-formalism and neo-functionalism, which have

characterised legal policy in recent years, a heavy reliance on arguments of ‘necessity’,
‘objectivity’ and ‘naturalness’ came to prepare the ground for a functionalist
interpretation and application of legal norms in politically charged contexts experiencing
fundamental shifts from public to private regulation. The attack on contract adjudication
and governmental ‘intervention’ that accompanied these developments regularly rested on
an understanding of the market as a-political, a-historic and quasi-natural.191 This
depiction of the market and the state as separate worlds formed troubling alliances with
policy recommendations promoting the privatisation of public services that were often
fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost reduction.192 Yet whether or not, and in what
forms, private actors assume formerly public regulatory functions, represents the outcome of
political choices and of other socio-economic developments at both the national and
transnational level.193 The allegedly available ‘fresh start’ for societal self-regulation
without state interference—at least as it was widely perceived until the outbreak of the
2007 financial crisis—stood in stark contrast to the observations made many decades
ago, that when market actors are enabled and empowered to exercise their private
autonomy they are exercising this freedom based on public deliberation and consensus.194
While there is considerable reason to believe, today, that we have entered a stage in the
assessment of state and market where we have to carefully turn our attention again to the
long and winding history of this relationship (between state and market),195 the
identification of starting points for a reconstructive project is far from obvious.196 As the
treacherous denationalisation197 of regulatory areas continues to pose tremendous
conceptual problems for state-based theories of law, we must aim to combine our
methodological inquiry into the nature of transnational law with a bold reconstruction of
critical perspectives from which to discuss the need for ‘better’, ‘more efficient’,

‘tougher’ etc regulation, that is needed today in the face of what continues to unfold as a
dramatic financial and economic crisis.

C. Transnational Governance Regimes as Cases in Point of Post-Regulatory Law
As is evidenced for example by the case of corporate governance regulation, many of
today’s regulatory regimes are irreversibly transnational and hybrid in nature.198 While we
continue to study them through nationally oriented textbooks and case law, we soon learn
that the rules and instruments we are dealing with are products of a far-reaching,
fundamental transformation of the regulatory landscape.199 As corporate law is being
shaped by a complex mix of public, private, state-based and non-state-based norms,
principles and rules, generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of actors200
and experts,201 even the most casual glance at today’s corporate governance debates
reveals two important aspects. One is the way in which the analysis of contemporary
corporate governance regulation can help us to become sensitive to the emerging, new
framework within which corporate governance rules are evolving, a framework which is
constituted by a combination of local and transnational actors and norms, connected
through ‘networks’ and migrating standards.202 As reflected in the further expanding
research on transnational regulatory areas,203 the high degree of technicality of the
regulatory subjects and the crucial role of expert committees in drafting applicable norms at
considerable distance from formal legislative processes204 present a formidable
challenge to traditional, regulatory theories of law.205
As we begin to understand the emerging regulatory frameworks in highly specialised
areas as an illustration of contemporary rule-making, we can appreciate the legal pluralist

deconstruction of formal and informal legal orders in a new light. Building, on the one
hand, on early legal-sociological work by Ehrlich (‘living law’) and Gurvitch (‘social law’),
we are prompted to revisit the core question of any sociology of law, namely how ‘to
investigate the correlations between law and other spheres of society’.206 Expanding the
spectrum, on the other hand, with a view to legal pluralist work by scholars like Moore,207
Galanter,208 Macaulay,209 Santos210 and Teubner,211 contemporary assessments of ‘hybrid
legal spaces’212 that are not sufficiently captured by references to local or national contexts
might help us understand better the references to a distinctly transnational emergence of
regulatory regimes. Again, this reading of ‘transnational’ allows us to study such regimes not
as entirely detached from national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of and
reaching beyond them.213 As alluded to above, the transnational dimension of new actors
and

newly

emerging

forms

of

norms

would

be

able

to

radicalise

their

‘semiautonomous’ nature (Moore) in the following way: we would conceive of
regulatory spaces as being marked by a dynamic and often problematically instrumentalised
tension between formal and informal norm-making processes.
But, in contrast to the ever more refined sociological perspective on this evolving
transnational regulatory landscape, the question of politics must continue to linger
painfully.214 Again, an example taken from the corporate law context may serve as an
illustration. The much lamented regulatory ‘failure’ of traditional, state-based
legalpolitical intervention into multinational corporations has long served as an argument
for the need to develop either distinctly ‘post-national’, institutionalised governance
forms or to further strengthen the grip of self-regulatory and soft instruments with only
voluntary binding nature.215 Mirroring the complex, hard-to-navigate landscape of bordercrossing corporate activity, the proposed conceptual approaches vary greatly as to their

reliance on self-regulation, market-based reputational enforcement and traditional statutory
intervention. Constituting anything but a coherent set of applicable approaches to corporate
regulation,

they

range

from

references

to

‘global

jurisdiction’216 to

the

reconceptualisation of ‘torture as tort’ and the elaboration of transnational civil human
rights litigation.217 Closely connected to this, there have been wide-ranging efforts to
further build on scandalisation instruments that include global shaming.218 Finally, the
increased if not resigned reliance on soft law instruments, self-binding norms, and codes of
conduct and best practice,219 altogether suggests an irreversible trend away from
‘government’, towards ‘governance’.220
As transnational governance regimes, then, fields such as corporate governance,
labour law,221 capital market law, contract law in general and consumer protection law in
particular222 are increasingly marked by the existence of opt-out clauses and self-regulation
mechanisms rather than enforceable hard-law rules.223 Does this mean that the legal
pluralist depiction of regulatory spheres as ‘semi-autonomous fields’224 is no longer able
to provide a sufficient starting point for a more comprehensive critique of the existing
machinery of justice?225 Does the radical fragmentation of transnational law today imply that
the original legal pluralist sword is too blunt to cut through the distinctly post-national
constellation of regulatory regimes? The opposite is true: legal pluralism can forcefully build
on its learned lessons in the aftermath of the decaying welfare state and ‘legal
centralism’. Whilst unable to translate directly the insights gained in those contexts onto the
transnational sphere, they can nevertheless assist in depicting the multifaceted nature of
transnational governance. This becomes particularly evident where, in a context such as an
evolving political governance system such as in Europe, claims about ‘private autonomy’
and ‘market freedom’ are advanced226 that seem to echo many of the previous contestations

of market intervention and judicial activism within the nation state.227 Our renewed interest
in different meanings of embedded markets is of crucial importance at a time when the
financialist paradigm seems to have outrun itself and where, in our search for a new basis
and framework for public policy228 in a highly interconnected transnational regulatory,
post welfare-state era, we cannot simply return to ‘more state, less market’ formulas.
The crucial contribution of a legal pluralist analysis lies in its rendering the boundaries
between the state and the market qualitative rather than quantitative. The central
question is not whether there is a need for more or less state (or market), but rather what is at
stake in making references to either.
Table 3: Law as Non-Law—Transnational Legal Pluralism

Table 3 picks up this line of thought and ties it back to the narrative of loss (of legal unity,
certainty and hierarchy) that we encountered at the beginning of this article. While the
idea of loss only makes sense when we both idealise and immunise law in the nation state
against its inherent ‘other’, the consequence of realising that we must think of law as the
inseparability of law/non-law is a breaking down of the horizontal boundaries between
‘national’ and ‘global’ law. Just as the boundary between law and non-law emerges as
paradoxical, the dividing line between the national and the global is not one governed by
jurisdiction. It is, instead, one that relies on a critical reconstruction of the project of
law—and, as noted earlier, we embrace ‘transnational law’ as a methodological project on
the very nature of normativity generally and law more particularly. The much alleged
impossibility of law on a global scale must become the invitation to revitalise the legal
pluralist project of questioning what is at stake when we differentiate between law and
non-law. This is the defining inquiry into the nature of transnational governance.

6. THE ARGUMENT FOR TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM

As Saskia Sassen has recently reiterated, dryly and irrefutably, there is an intimate
connection between the search for and the critique of law and the nation state.229 Her
observation is particularly astute as Sassen has, over the years,230 contributed much to our
understanding of how the allegedly external, victimising state of ‘globalisation’ is
distinctly co-evolving with and produced, constructed and conceived within the
‘national’. Instead of positing globalisation as a process, event or development that

overwhelms nation states, national economies and domestic political processes to haunt,
discipline and submerge them, Sassen’s depiction—like Santos’231—points back to the
nation state and to sub-national spheres of societal activity and decision-making. It is
within these spheres that elements of physical and intellectual texture emerge and coalesce to
produce border-crossing ‘global assemblages’. These constitute distinct spheres that,
famously fuelled by, inter alia, the dramatic development of information technology and
other ‘transnational social and cultural practices’ such as human rights, nationality and
residence rights as well as intellectual property rights,232 integrate territorial and
deterritorial, vertical and horizontal ordering patterns to produce a structured regime of
societal activities.233
Sassen’s concept of ‘global assemblages’ constitutes a fruitful contribution to our
understanding of globalisation as a challenge to study the dramatic transformation of
institutional and semantic structures in an era of intensifying transnational communication
and governance regimes.
Sassen’s idea of global assemblages allows us to structure the sphere between the
national and the international/global that has been plaguing the legal imagination for
some time now.234 Her main contribution can be seen in her unerring commitment to
simultaneously emphasise and relativise the national in the emerging cartography of a
globalised world. Sassen’s emphasis on the national and sub-national, viz local, processes
and institutions goes a long way toward allowing us to identify the concrete places at
which decisions that result in globalisation phenomena are prepared, taken and
implemented. Her work on global cities is of particular relevance in this regard. Here,
Sassen has been arguing convincingly that global cities gain autonomy from their local
environments both by adapting real-time collaborative and networking capacities with

other cities and operative centres and by successfully demanding and implementing a
facilitating, supportive infrastructure (electricity, broadband, digitisation, 24/7 service,
access and maintenance).235 At the same time, for Sassen, the depiction of the particular
‘embeddedness’ of the global city in a local environment only makes sense in connection
with an appreciation of the particular spaces that open up in and between these concrete
cities as places. Highlighting in particular the crucial role played by the breathtaking
advances in information technology that fuel the space-time compression through realtime
collaboration, connection, and linking of formerly distant places, actors and centres, Sassen,
then as now,236 recognises the central challenge that these changes pose for the
‘effectiveness of current framings for state authority and democratic participation’.237
Spaces in Sassen’s understanding, then, are not to be mistaken with territorially or
geographically defined ‘areas’, but constitute much more ambiguous realms that are
constituted through societal interaction as well as through intellectual construction. Examples
include ‘global cities and transboundary publics’238 but also global capital markets,239
which illustrate how the triad of ‘territory, authority, rights’ is inescapably subjected to
increasingly

denationalised

processes

of

deassembling

and

reassembling.240

The

relativisation of the national basis of globalisation in Sassen’s work proceeds in relation to
the well-known institutions, reference points and established procedures such as states,
parliaments, administrative agencies and, importantly, courts. These institutions have long
structured the economic, political and legal order and are now struggling to reassert their
previously held roles and positions of power.241 This—relative—relativisation of the national
feeds into the formation of a newly emerging spatial category: the focus on space promises
to capture more adequately the way in which our understanding of regulatory landscapes
as well as of scopes of human interactions still reckons with concretely identifiable

places of legal and political regulation while at the same time reaching beyond it. While
the latter is aptly depicted in both Sassen’s and Santos’ analysis of the interaction between
the national and the global, the former has been given a powerful expression by David
Levi-Faur’s concept of ‘regulatory capitalism’.242 This

constellation

presents

tremendous challenges to both an analytical and a prescriptive framework that was
developed with reference to a more or less well defined, territorially confined and
institutionally close-knit regulatory framework.243 To be sure, one challenge of this embrace
of space consists in developing an appropriate language with which to communicate about
the institutional and normative challenges in a world that cannot effectively be governed
through domestic and domestically minded rules.244 The other challenge arises from the
intricate nature of the spaces unfolding in the transnational realm. Part of the reason for
the Washington Consensus’ effectiveness in streamlining— literally on a global scale—
regulatory politics, has to be seen in the particular connections and interdependencies that
were created between, say, corporate, tax, labour, financial and social regulation. Bound to
upset and to undermine fragile balances between different social interests, the deregulation of
corporate, commercial and financial activity gave rise to an overwhelming amount of new
regulatory institutions and instruments,245 all the while promoting a principle of ‘good
governance’ marked by minimum state intervention into allegedly self-regulating markets.
Among the primary victims, surely, was and

remains labour, as regards both the

differently institutionalised forms of workers’

protection, industrial relations and

collective bargaining and the sobering erosion of basically all forms of employment
security. A far cry from Polanyi’s succinct critique of Speenhamland246 and Arendt’s
meditations on the transformation of the worker into a political actor,247 the rise of the
‘precariat’248 has been accompanied by an across-theboard undermining of both

institutional and individual frameworks of workers’ rights.249 Conceptual approaches such as
democratic experimentalism,250 regulatory capitalism and transnational labour citizenship251
constitute attempts to develop an appropriately designed framework of legal analysis and
regulation in light of a radically disembedded regulatory landscape.
The above can be seen as one among many examples that illustrate how the
specifically European Post-Westphalian legal perspective, which predominantly rested on an
understanding of a hierarchically structured system of order,252 has, within the
confines of the nation state and later in light of a fast-proliferating realm of
bordercrossing hybrid regulatory activity, been put on the defensive. Much in the
present discussions about the fate of law in an era of globalisation is oriented around the
form, nature and quality of a global legal order.253 Yet, as captured in Table 3, such
investigations remain for the most part confined to an analysis on the left-hand side of
the matrix, namely to an exercise in contrasting the presently perceived absence of
reliable legal institutions and instruments on the global scale with an allegedly perished
state of legal certainty, hierarchy of norms and the unity of law within the nation state. It is
only when we care to remember the description of the legal order from a legal pluralist point
of view that the fundamental fragility of the supposedly stable and unified legal system
becomes once more apparent. Once we revisit the pluralist contestation of law’s exclusivity
and its alleged hierarchical supremacy within the nation state, we begin to see the transition
from a nation state-based understanding of law towards one of ‘global law’ as a
continuation— rather than a loss—of a theoretical investigation into the meaning of
law and legal ordering. It is this perspective that should drive lawyers’ interest in the
present musings about ‘space’.
The lawyer struggling to understand the fate of her field in a world of transition from

national to global is bound to engage in a both methodological and theoretical inquiry. It
is methodological in the sense that legal concepts are competing with alternative
disciplinary approaches to effectively address the regulatory challenges and goals arising
from ‘global governance’. It is theoretical in the sense that the widely observable
proliferation of norm creation and norm administration in numerous areas of what legal
scholars and political scientists have been coining ‘private transnational regulation’254
prompts a revisiting of the ‘concept’ of law. But, in addition, the claims laid to this space are
fiercely driven by political, religious, cultural and ‘social’ critique. What is at stake in fact is
less an answer to the question whether or not the norms in question are law. Such questions
were relatively easily posed—and answered—in the context of the fairly differentiated
legal systems of Western welfare states, in which distinctions between public and private
ordering could usually be drawn by reference either to the larger societal interest in
question or to the institutional affiliation of the norm’s author, in other words the
‘authority’ of the norm entrepreneur. In the transnational space, this institutional
framework is being fundamentally reshaped. The constitutional order, on the basis of
which it was possible in Western nation states to constantly scrutinise and redraw the
boundaries between public and private regulatory activity, is largely absent in the
transnational space. Instead, process-oriented principles such as accountability and
transparency are mobilised and implemented in a vast array of transnational norm creations
in order to fill this void. At the heart of such attempts—as in the ‘Global
Administrative Law’ project—is the struggle over a new foundation of legitimacy. Again,
moving out of the highly regulated space of the nation state, the struggle over legitimacy
becomes one of deep-running conflicts and the various competing attempts to solve them. As
such, for lawyers and their field, the reference to ‘space’ is first and foremost a reminder of

the fragility of their conceptual framework and their regulatory instruments.
What, then, follows from this constellation for the lawyer and legal theory? Included in
the resulting task for the lawyer in her quest to reassess the nature of global legal
regulation is the need to scrutinise and explore both the obvious and the not so obvious
differences between law and competing regulatory approaches that are on offer in a
globalising world, for example, from economics, religion and ‘culture’. The lawyer will
tend to distinguish her project from those competitors in both formal and substantive
dimensions. As regards form, the primary mark of distinction that she will resort to is
hierarchy, for what sustains the typical lawyer is the belief in a system of social order that is
built on a model of legitimate authorisation, on which are based rules of norm creation,
implementation and enforcement.255 In terms of substance, the demarcation between
law and alternative forms of social order can be drawn with reference to the centrality of
‘justice’ to the legal system. Yet, it soon becomes clear that the self-referentiality of justice in
the legal system256 is echoed and paralleled by similar, even if differently labelled,
selfreferences in other systems. Law’s claim to be the sole guardian of really any concept of
justice, in other words of justice ‘per se’, cannot in the end escape its deconstruction as
pure semantics.
Law’s relativisation, then, in the concert of differently conceived ‘governance’ models, is
a sobering prospect. At the same time, it is one that seems distressingly compatible with the
long-triumphant neo-liberal assertions of law’s role in facilitating global market
activity and universal freedom—from, say, state intervention. If law were really not more
than a different label for ‘good governance’, it would indeed have little if anything to add to
the current investigations into the consequences of globalisation. That is why the lower
right-hand corner of the matrix in Table 3 becomes an important final step in the attempt to

picture the nature and fate of law in our time. This part of the matrix depicts the global
illustrations of the contestation of legal order and of its claims to supremacy, hierarchy,
unity and universality. The decisive step in making sense of the matrix now is to ask how we
must understand the boundary between the inherently contestable, amorphous,
incoherent and not fully articulable principles, rules and instruments that emerge here,
and ‘law’. In other words, how can concepts such as ‘transnational labour citizenship’,
‘global civil society’ and ‘global administrative law’ become integral components of a
global order, which we would justly refer to as a legal order?
The answer lies in the connection between the upper and the lower parts of the righthand
corner of the matrix. At the level of the nation state, we saw the dissolution of the vertical
boundary between ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ as a result of understanding that none of the
principles, rules, instruments or institutions associated with law (the upper left-hand corner
of the matrix) would exist without the ‘other’, without the contestation, constant
undermining and challenge of the existing system of ‘law’. Two steps remain: the first is
that when we apply this logic to the lower side of the matrix through which we try to
depict the ‘global’ scale of law, it becomes apparent that the vertical boundary between
‘law’ and ‘non-law’ must cease, as it, too, is a misrepresentation of the reciprocal
interdependency of the right and left sides of the divide. Indeed, the very fluid character of
emerging global ‘legal’ institutions must occur in face of the fundamental challenge and
contestation of all that is not or not yet law.
The last step: now with the dividing line between ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ on both the
national and the global levels revealed as a paradoxical boundary between two opposites
which can neither be separated nor become one, we are left with the remaining divider
between the national and the global. The nature of that divide has itself, however, become

deeply questionable as well. One of its main justifications, namely law’s close association
with the state, has been challenged to the degree that legal pluralism has opened our eyes to
a host of normative orders and contexts of legal ordering with forms of
institutionalisation that do not fit into the dualist model of state and society. Moreover,
legal fields that lawyers had identified and scrutinised within the confines of the nation
state have—in following the logic of the societal areas prompting legal regulation—been
burgeoning ‘outward’, as it were, driven by the claim to ‘extend’ their regulatory reach to
border-crossing and, indeed, global events and activities. But, with law following the
rationality of societal differentiation, the image of law’s outbound journey into a world of
global meaning is misleading. This journey could just as well be described as an
inbound one, as an exploration that unfolds along the extremely fine capillaries of a
convulsing body of society into its deepest inner parts and, there, asserts its logic of ‘legal’
and ‘illegal’. In light of influential images of a ‘shrinking world’,257 globally spanning
migration flows,258 media coverage of formerly distant events and concerns259 and a
deafening expansion of a global culture,260 it is often perceived that the law has in fact been
under pressure to travel ‘beyond’ the boundaries of the nation state, to assert and to regain its
regulatory power in an otherwise unruly global world. And in fact, developments under the
label of legal globalisation have taken on a wide range of forms, from local courts
claiming ‘universal’ jurisdiction261 to the development of behaviour-guiding norms in
the form of codes of conduct, best practice guidelines and recommendations, which can
themselves no longer be conceived of as either public or private, national or international
law.
It is this diffusion of normative orders in the form of proliferating norm producers
and enforcement schemes that seriously calls into question the dividing line between a

national and a global level of lawmaking. Indeed, as mentioned above, many of today’s
regulatory regimes combine public and private, direct and indirect forms of norm
creation and administration. These ‘transnational law regimes’262 emerge, on the one
hand, through actors who derive their lawmaking power not necessarily or exclusively
from politically and formally institutionalised hierarchies but increasingly from
selflegitimating, issue or problem-area driven processes of norm production, and from a
global flow of normative principles, institutional initiatives, ‘migrating principles’263 and
norms, on the other.
The central argument to be made here is that we must conceive of this transformation
and erosion of the vertical (law/non-law) and horizontal (national/global) boundaries as a
methodological inquiry into the way in which spaces of legal order are being defined. The
legal pluralist project of the twentieth century in many ways opened the door to a harsh,
often very empirically based, critique of the shortcomings and blindspots of existing,
formally institutionalised legal cultures. The legal pluralists pushed for a
theorisation that involved applying legal sociological insights gained in foreign, often
indigenous, legal cultures to domestic rule of law systems, eventually paving the way for a
tremendously rich series of investigations into the inner and outer worlds of different
legal cultures.264 The present state of research on ‘law and globalisation’ suggests that the
demarcation of national and global forms of law today is as much a methodological (and
critical) enterprise as the legal pluralist deconstruction of legal hierarchy and unity of
law was then.
Transnational law is another name for transnational legal pluralism, for an (inherently
interdisciplinary) inquiry into the nature of legal regulation of problems, which have long
been extending beyond the confines of jurisdiction. Such regulatory challenges both

‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the nation state,265 have always been at the heart of the
sociolegal orientation of the legal pluralist inquiry into the myriad contexts, forms
and dynamics of norm creation.266 But, as the transnational legal pluralist project
takes seriously the functional differentiation of a society in search of its law, it is bound
to suggest and to explore connections between the law/non-law collisions then and now,
and between those here and those ‘out there’. And so, in trying to make sense of the
changing frameworks of legal regulation for global human conduct and societal
development, the transnational legal pluralist is bound to revisit former instances of legal
realism, anti-formalism, functionalism, deconstruction and ‘political legal theory’. But
the insights and lessons to be gained from this reconstruction are both limited and risky.
Too often will the learned understandings of ‘rights’, of hierarchy or equality make the
pluralist blind to the particular dynamics that govern a normative field.267 In response,
transnational legal pluralism as a methodology implies a radical unfolding of the tension
between the four different parts of the matrix. The law of a highly differentiated world
society can neither be based on the rigid separation of law and non-law nor on a
distinction between national and global. Instead, the transnational legal pluralist project
highlights the evolution of legal categories that can generate order under circumstances
where the traditional institutional framework and reference sets have to be seen as
contingent. Such an evolution is part of a process of contending forces and dynamics
with unpredictable outcomes. Existing and emerging research on regulatory regimes and
regulatory governance as umbrella concepts for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of
law and regulation points to the need to better connect seemingly disparate research and
policy agendas. There are important parallels between, say, the legal pluralist critique of
regulatory law on the one hand and investigations in economic sociology into the

evolving nature of the embeddedness of markets on the other.268
Other parallels exist between the progressive methodological orientation of
responsive/reflexive law in the 1970s and 1980s and ‘cosmopolitanism’ today269 and the
recent, politically much more ambivalent interest in ‘social norms’.270 For each of these
inquiries, a first task consists of continuing or opening and pursuing dialogues between
law and economics, law and sociology, law and anthropology, law and political economy. A
second task consists of effectively connecting the domestically unfolded critique of law
under various guises—notably, those of legal realism, critical legal studies, law and
economics, feminist legal studies or critical race theory, postcolonialism or Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), of responsive, reflexive law, as well as social
norms—with, say, current debates around global governance, ‘global administrative law’,
regulatory networks or transnational law. While we are not coming to such an analysis
without baggage, the challenge remains how best to apply the things learned and the
things discovered in the face of an extremely pluralistic and contested landscape.
Beginning with neither taking law for granted nor mourning its death might provide a
promising starting point for an analysis of legal regulation and its alternatives in a
changing world.
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